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Factual Background:         

William Knichel executed a durable power of attorney and a will in 2002, naming his two grown children as his agents and leaving his entire estate to them.  In 2003, Knichel changed the primary beneficiary on his life insurance policy to his companion of twenty years and caretaker, Anita Madsen, and transferred his home and one bank account in joint tenancy to her.  In 2004, Knichel had an attorney, Charles Amen of the Purcell and Amen law firm, prepare a new will and powers of attorney and create a trust that was intended to hold Mr. Knichel’s retirement assets and distribute them in three equal shares to Madsen and his children.  In the trust, Amen’s firm was named “special co-trustee,” granting similar rights and duties as those exercised by a standard trustee plus special additional powers.

Amen and Madsen began transferring Knichel’s retirement assets into the trust account, but UBS denied the request to transfer the UBS IRA.  Knichel died in October 2004.  When Knichel’s children requested an accounting in December 2005 and again in March 2006, Amen provided them with an inaccurate one that was incomplete in various aspects and also erroneously included the UBS IRA as a trust asset.  Ultimately, UBS distributed the UBS IRA proceeds directly to the children.  At Amen’s instruction, Madsen made an equivalent distribution from the other trust assets to herself, and paid herself a $6,000 fee as trustee and $2,400 to Amen for his representation of her as trustee.

In June 2007, having yet to receive an accurate accounting, the children filed suit against both Madsen and Amen claiming Madsen had breached her powers of attorney and fiduciary duties, unduly influenced Knichel’s asset collection, and unjustly enriched herself at their expense.  The children also sought to remove Amen’s firm as special co-trustee and counsel to Madsen in any capacity due to compounded conflicts of interest.  Madsen and Amen filed a motion to dismiss.

St. Louis City Circuit Court, J. Dowd, Held:

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and set another hearing to focus on Amen’s potential conflicts of interest.  The trial court found Madsen had violated her fiduciary duties, removed her as trustee, and ordered her to forfeit her trustee fees and reimburse the trust for the distributions she made to herself and Amen.

The Court noted Amen, as special co-trustee, owed the same fiduciary duty to the children as Madsen had.  Therefore, once Amen began to advise and serve Madsen, he breached his fiduciary duty by not acting impartial to all beneficiaries.  The trial court removed Amen’s firm as special co-trustee and amended the trust to omit the position.

Amen challenged the trial court’s judgment asserting there was insufficient evidence to find he breached his fiduciary duty, and that the trial court abused its discretion by eliminating the special co-trustee provision.  Neither Madsen nor the children challenged the Court’s judgment.  The children filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that Amen lacked standing.

Court of Appeals, P.J. Aherns, Held:

Dismissed for lack of standing.   The Court noted that this was not the first case where the law firm of Purcell and Amen has attempted to reinstate itself as co-trustee on appeal against the wishes of the beneficiaries.  In In Re Forbeck, Amen’s partner attempted to appeal the dismissal of a guardianship petition that named his firm as “special co-trustee.”  The Court found he lacked standing.  Even though that was a guardianship case, and, therefore, differed from this case, it was cited with other Missouri precedent regarding probate matters to guide this decision.

Additionally, because chapter 456 of the Missouri Uniform Trust Code (MUTC) does not address appellate standing, the general appeals statute, section 512.020, applied and states the right to appeal belongs to: “any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause.”

Amen claimed that he was aggrieved and relied on Section 456.1-103 of the MUTC which includes fiduciaries within the definition of “interested persons.”  The definition of “interested persons” clearly enables a fiduciary or personal representative to participate in litigation on behalf of trust beneficiaries.  Here, neither Madsen nor the children challenged the Court’s judgment.

To determine when a party is “aggrieved,” the Court looked to Betty G. Weldon Revocable Trust ex. Rel. Vivion v. Weldon ex rel. Weldon, 231 S.W.3d 158,168 (MoApp.W.D. 2007).  Under Weldon, a party is “aggrieved” when the judgment operates prejudicially and directly on his personal or property rights or interest.

In this case, Amen’s right to collect fees was not a beneficial interest, but compensation allowed by law.  His personal accreditation and reputation, which he asserted would be jeopardized by his removal as special co-trustee for breach of fiduciary duty, is not a pecuniary interest either.  Therefore, Amen’s grievances provided no legal basis for recognizing Amen as an “aggrieved” party. “A party who has not been aggrieved has no standing to appeal.” Weldon.  Because Amen did not have standing to appeal, his appeal was dismissed.