LeKander v. In the Estate of William Robert LeKander Sr., 345 S.W.3d 282 (Mo.App. S.D. 2011)
Factual Background:
Mr. and Ms. LeKander had purchased a home together during their marriage. They divorced in April 2009. A settlement agreement, drafted by Ms. LeKander’s attorney, was incorporated into the divorce decree; it provided the home would be sold, and Mr. and Ms. LeKander would split the “proceeds”. Until then, the agreement provided Ms. LeKander would vacate the home, and Mr. LeKander would continue to live there. Ms. LeKander made interest-only payments on the mortgage. The home still had not been sold at Mr. LeKander’s death in June 2009. Ms. LeKander filed a claim against the estate of her ex-husband seeking payment of the outstanding balance of the mortgage.
Greene County Circuit Court, J. Conklin, Held:
The trial court found the language in the settlement agreement to be ambiguous. The trial court entered a judgment denying Ms. LeKander’s claim for the full balance of the mortgage and awarded her a reimbursement for the interest-only payments she had made after Mr. LeKander’s death.
Court of Appeals, J. Burrell, Held:
Affirmed. Ms. LeKander tried to argue two points on appeal.
As to her first point, Ms. LeKander contended the trial court erred in finding ambiguity in the language of the settlement agreement. Marital settlement agreements are construed using ordinary contract principles, and whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. An ambiguity occurs when, in looking at the four corners of a document, the terms are susceptible of more than one meaning so that reasonable persons may fairly and honestly differ in their construction of the terms. Here, the Court pointed out that “proceeds” could either mean (1) total amount brought in by a sale or (2) the net amount received after deductions. Additionally, language stating that Mr. LeKander was to make monthly payments “until home is sold,” could be construed to mean Mr. LeKander would not assume the entire indebtedness, as Ms. LeKander tried to argue. This Court finds reasonable persons could fairly and honestly differ as to what the language in the settlement agreement means, thus resulting in an ambiguity.
In second point, Ms. LeKander argued the trial court failed to look beyond the face of the agreement to the parties’ intent. If a contract is ambiguous, Missouri law states it will be construed against the drafter where no other evidence of the parties’ intent exists. Even if all the evidence Ms. LeKander brings forth was believed, the Court pointed out that there was nothing to demonstrate Mr. LeKander’s intent. The intent of both parties is relevant in construing an ambiguous contract. In the absence of credible extrinsic evidence of both parties’ intent, this Court found that the trial court properly construed the contract against the drafter, Ms. LeKander.