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Factual Background: 

Decedent established a trust and purportedly executed a will during his life. Exactly one year after his death, his widow, Petitioner Luanne S. Unnerstall, filed a petition in the probate division of the Franklin County circuit court to administer his estate.  Later, the purported will was presented to the probate division.  Petitioner asserted that her husband’s assets should be subject to probate as though he died without a will because the will was not presented within one year as required by law.

Held:

The Circuit Court of Franklin County admitted the purported will to probate and granted letters testamentary to Gary Unnerstall, the decedent’s nephew, whom the will names as executor.  Mrs. Unnerstall petitioned the Supreme Court of Missouri for a writ of mandamus requiring the respondent judge to vacate the order admitting the will to probate and to enter an order declaring that the decedent died intestate.

Supreme Court, Wolff, J., Held:

Permanent writ issued.  RSMo section 473.050 prevents a will from being presented more than one year after the death of a decedent if notice of letters has not been published already, and thus, a judge should not admit such a will to probate or issue letters testamentary in accordance with said will.

Rationale:

Prior to the enactment of the current time limits in section 473.050, it was settled law that no will could be admitted and no administration of the will could occur unless application was made to do so within one year of the decedent’s death.  With the enactment of sections 473.050.3 and 473.050.4, however, the legislature changed this rule.  Section 473.050.4 now states that as long as a will is admitted within subsection 3’s time limits, the will “may be exhibited to be received and administration granted on such will at any time after presentment.”  This change only extended the time for administration of a will, not presentment.

If the legislature had intended to eliminate the limitation whenever notice of letters issued, no matter how much time had passed since the testator’s death, it would have been clearer.  Keeping the one-year language of section 473.050.3(2) indicates legislative intent to keep a one-year limitation on the presentment of a will.